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Did Sarbanes-Oxley Lead to Better
Financial Reporting?
A Survey of Recent Research

By Dennis Chambers,
Dana R. Hermanson, and Jeff L. Payne

O

n July 25, 2002, Congress overwhelmingly passed the landmark
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX)
in reaction to a series of financial
accounting scandals involving such companies as Enron and WorldCom, as well as
to the demise of Arthur Andersen. Since the
passage of SOX, there has been a great deal
of controversy about the costs and benefits
of this dramatic expansion of federal oversight and regulation. One author dubbed
SOX “quack corporate governance” and
noted that “legislation in the immediate
aftermath of a public scandal or crisis is a
formula for poor public policymaking”
(Roberta Romano, “The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 114,
pp. 1521–1612, May 2005).
Recently, several accounting studies have
begun to shed light on another aspect of
the SOX debate: What benefits arose from
the passage of SOX? Five of these studies
are described and summarized below.

Costs and Benefits of SOX
Until recently, the debate about SOX has
tended to be a one-sided affair—the criticism
of the act’s high costs dominating any praise
of its potential benefits. This is not surprising, given that a cost argument is the easier
one to make. The costs associated with SOX
were mostly front-loaded, coming at the
beginning of the process before any benefits
are realized. In addition, the direct costs of
implementing SOX are relatively easy to
tabulate and report. A number of academic
studies have confirmed the anecdotal and
survey-based evidence that the costs to comply with SOX have been quite high (e.g.,
Jagan Krishnan, Dasaratha Rama, and
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Yinghong Zhang, “Costs to Comply with
SOX Section 404,” Auditing: A Journal of
Practice & Theory, vol. 27, no. 1, pp.
169–186, May 2008).
SOX was explicitly intended to improve
financial reporting and restore investor confidence in those reports. Several provisions
were specifically designed to fulfill this
purpose. SOX section 302 calls for CEOs
and CFOs to certify financial reports—with
significant criminal penalties for doing so
falsely—in order to promote honest and

transparent financial reporting. The provisions of section 404, requiring the documentation and auditing of internal controls,
were intended to improve the quality of
financial reports by reducing unintentional
and intentional misstatements. A number of
provisions were intended to improve the
quality of audits. SOX provided for the creation of the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) and gave it the
mandate to inspect audit firms. SOX also
includes provisions to increase auditor
SEPTEMBER 2010 / THE CPA JOURNAL

independence by prohibiting auditors from
providing most forms of nonaudit services
to audit clients, and by strengthening the relationship between the auditor and the audit
committee.
While the costs of implementation can
be directly observed and accumulated, the
intended benefits of SOX—more accurate
and reliable financial reporting—cannot be
assessed as easily. In considering the potential benefits of SOX, there are several
important questions:
■ Have financial reports become more
accurate or more reliable?
■ If financial reports have become more
accurate or more reliable, what is the monetary benefit to the economy?
■ What is the value of greater investor
confidence in companies’ financial reports?

Discussion of Accounting Research
Recent accounting research has begun
to make progress answering the first
question: Have financial reports become
more accurate or more reliable? While
these studies do not attempt to monetize
the benefits from SOX, they take the first
step of measuring whether financial reports
have become more accurate or reliable
since the passage of SOX. This article summarizes five of these studies (see the
Exhibit for information on each). The
authors chose these five papers from
among the hundreds in the field because
they specifically address reporting quality
before and after SOX. Many articles
address earnings management or the quality of accounting, but these five specifically address whether financial reporting
quality appears to have changed—on an
overall basis, encompassing thousands of
companies—post-SOX. Included in the
five are two papers that are still in the journal review process, so as to provide the
most current information possible. (This
approach is consistent with normal procedure in the academic literature.)
The difficult challenge facing accounting researchers in these studies is measuring financial reporting quality. What constitutes reporting “quality” and how can we
observe greater or lesser quality? Four of
the studies evaluate reporting quality by
measuring “abnormal” accruals (also called
“discretionary” accruals). This is a widely
accepted method in the financial accountSEPTEMBER 2010 / THE CPA JOURNAL

ing literature that has been used in hundreds of academic studies over the past two
decades. Much of this literature uses variations of the “Jones model” (Jennifer J.
Jones, “Earnings Management During
Import Relief Investigations,” Journal of
Accounting Research, vol. 29, no. 2, pp.
193-228, 1991).
The current version of the Jones model
uses a company’s revenue, earnings, and
level of productive assets to estimate a normal level of accruals (accruals are measured in some studies as the difference
between operating income and operating
cash flows, and in other studies as the
change in working capital or the change in
noncash assets and liabilities). Accruals in
excess of a normal level, either in an
income-increasing or income-decreasing
direction, constitute possible earnings
manipulation by management and, thus,
lower the quality of financial reporting. In
essence, abnormal accruals indicate that the
accruals are outside the range that would
be expected for the company, and a likely explanation is that management is
manipulating the accruals to achieve a
desired reporting outcome. Similarly, the
IRS may review taxpayer data for abnormal deductions. If the deductions are outside the range of what is expected, given
a taxpayer’s income and other circumstances, then there is the potential that the
taxpayer has manipulated the deductions.
Research using abnormal accruals to
assess reporting quality is inherently different from what individual auditors do.
Researchers are interested in overall patterns (e.g., is reporting quality higher postSOX?), and they use thousands of companies and advanced statistical methods
in the analysis. Practicing auditors are interested in whether a single company’s reporting quality is sound, and they focus on
the specifics of that particular setting
(e.g., inventory reserve, bad debts reserve,
warranty liability). This difference in
approaches is significant—as different as
cancer researchers studying thousands of
people to find links between lifestyle and
the incidence of cancer, as contrasted
with an individual oncologist focusing on
one patient’s diagnosis and treatment.
In the final study, the authors measure
reporting quality by directly measuring
accrual reliability. Accruals are considered

to be more reliable when they persist—that
is, they tend to be found again in the following year’s earnings. Unreliable accruals would be those that, because they are
the result of intentional or unintentional
misstatement, do not persist into the future.
This method is also based on previous
research.
Two of the studies also examine the use
of “real” earnings management. In these
cases, management changes the amount or
timing of actual transactions, such as reducing advertising spending and inventory
overproduction in order to manage earnings, rather than altering accruals to manage earnings (R. Z. Xu, G. K. Taylor, and
M. T. Dugan, “Review of Real Earnings
Management Literature,” Journal of
Accounting Literature, pp. 195–228, 2007).
Xu et al. describe real earnings management: “As an alternative to using accruals
and accounting choices, firms engaged in
real earnings management ‘undertake a
financing, investment, or operating activity primarily for the income effect, or
“accounting by-product,” rather than for
the net present value benefit of the activity for the firm’s stockholders [Hand et al.,
1990, p. 68].’”

Lobo and Zhou
In the first study, Gerald J. Lobo and
Jian Zhou (“Did Conservatism in Financial
Reporting Increase After the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act? Initial Evidence,” Accounting
Horizons, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 57–73, March
2006) define higher quality reporting as
more conservative reporting. They measure the conservatism of financial reports
before and after SOX. Conservatism is measured in two ways: first as the level of
income-increasing abnormal accruals and,
second, as the relative timing of the recognition of gains and losses. Fewer incomeincreasing abnormal accruals would
constitute greater conservatism. Later recognition of gains compared to losses would
also constitute greater conservatism. They
find that companies post-SOX—compared
to those pre-SOX—report fewer incomeincreasing abnormal accruals and relatively
later recognition of gains. They interpret the
greater conservatism after SOX as evidence
of higher reporting quality. Thus, this study’s
results are consistent with SOX promoting
higher quality financial reporting.
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Cohen, Dey, and Lys
In the second study, Daniel A. Cohen,
Aiyesha Dey, and Thomas Z. Lys (“Real
and Accrual-Based Earnings Management
in the Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley
Periods,” The Accounting Review, vol. 83,
no. 3, pp. 757–788, 2008) look at the
level of accruals-based earnings management in three time periods: the prescandal
period of 1987–1999, the scandal period of
2000–2001, and the post-SOX period of

2002–2005. They measure earnings management using income-increasing abnormal accruals, as well as a measure of real
earnings management.
Cohen et al. find evidence that accrualsbased earnings management increased in
the prescandal years, sharply increased in
the scandal years, and then decreased in
the post-SOX years. This is consistent with
a SOX-related benefit of better financial
reporting. They also find that real earn-

ings management increased in the postSOX period. They suggest that the effect
of SOX has been to reduce accrualsbased earnings management, with some
shift to real earnings management, arguing
that companies may have an incentive to
use real earnings management in the postSOX period because it is more difficult for
auditors and regulators to detect. This
suggests that post-SOX financial reporting quality has improved in one way

EXHIBIT
Benefits of SOX: Recent Research
Study

Description of Sample

Main Results

Gerald J. Lobo and Jian Zhou,
“Did Conservatism in Financial
Reporting Increase After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial
Evidence,” Accounting Horizons,
vol. 20, no. 1, March 2006.

14,396 company-year observations,
representing 4,441 companies with equal
fiscal years before and after SOX (2,757
with two years before and after SOX;
1,684 with one year before and after SOX).

Companies’ financial reports are more conservative
in the post-SOX period. Conservatism is found in
two ways. First, companies employ less incomeincreasing abnormal accruals. Second, they
recognize losses earlier and gains later.

Daniel A. Cohen, Aiyesha Dey,
and Thomas Z. Lys, “Real and
Accrual-Based Earnings
Management in the Pre- and
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods,”
The Accounting Review,
vol. 83, no. 3, 2008.

8,157 nonfinancial companies from
1987–2005, for a total of 87,217 companyyear observations. Periods categorized as
prescandal (1987–1999), scandal
(2000–2001), and post-SOX (2002–2005).

Accruals-based earnings management increased
over the pre-SOX period, accelerating in the
scandal period, and then decreasing post-SOX.
However, real earnings management
(by manipulating actual spending decisions)
increased in the post-SOX period. Companies
seem to be replacing accruals-based earnings
management with less detectable real earnings
management since SOX.

Eli Bartov and Daniel A. Cohen, 87,697 company-quarter observations from
“The ‘Numbers Game’ in the
nonregulated industries from 1987–2006,
Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley representing 6,186 companies.
Eras,” Journal of Accounting,
Auditing and Finance,
vol. 24, no. 4, 2009.

Reduced frequency of companies just meeting or
beating analysts’ earnings forecasts. This is due
to lower accruals-based earnings management
and fewer efforts to downwardly manage analysts’
expectations. However, real earnings management
has increased since SOX.

J. V. Carcello, C. W.
Hollingsworth, and S. Mastrolia,
“The Effect of PCAOB
Inspections on Big 4 Audit
Quality,” working paper, 2009.

Clients report lower income-increasing
discretionary accruals in the year after their Big
Four audit firm’s initial PCAOB inspection, with a
further decline in the second year after the
inspection. Similar tests after AICPA peer review
inspections find no similar decrease.

4,719 company-years between 2004–2006
of Big Four clients audited in the year
before and two years after the audit firm’s
initial PCAOB inspection.

Dennis J. Chambers and
21,679 company-years, over periods
Jeff L. Payne, “Audit Quality
1998–2001 (pre-SOX) and 2003–2006
and Accrual Reliability: Evidence (post-SOX), representing 5,080 companies.
from the Pre- and
Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods,”
working paper, 2009.
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The reliability of reported accruals increased in
the post-SOX period for companies audited by
both Big Four (Six) and non–Big Four audit firms.
The greatest improvement in accrual reliability
occurred for clients of non-Big N auditors, with
potentially impaired independence in the pre-SOX
period.

SEPTEMBER 2010 / THE CPA JOURNAL

(reduced accruals-based earnings management), but has declined in another way
(increased real earnings management).

Bartov and Cohen
Eli Bartov and Daniel A. Cohen (“The
‘Numbers Game’ in the Pre- and PostSarbanes-Oxley Eras,” Journal of
Accounting, Auditing and Finance, vol. 24,
no. 4, pp. 505–534, 2009) look at a particular setting where earnings management
often exists. Prior accounting studies have
discovered evidence from the pre-SOX
period that companies used earnings management techniques to just meet or beat
analyst earnings forecasts. Bartov and
Cohen look for evidence that this form of
earnings management behavior decreased
in the post-SOX period.
Similar to the previous study discussed,
they measure earnings management using
both income-increasing abnormal accruals
and real earnings management. They find
evidence that fewer companies are just meeting or beating analyst earnings forecasts in
the post-SOX period using accruals-based
earnings management. They do, however,
find greater use of real earnings management to just meet or beat forecasts in the
post-SOX period. Therefore, SOX appears
to have successfully reduced earnings
management using accruals-based methods.
To some degree, that behavior has been
replaced with a different form of earnings
management, using real business decisions.

Carcello, Hollingsworth, and Mastrolia
One of the key provisions of SOX was
the creation of the PCAOB and the requirement that large audit firms be inspected
annually by the regulator. J. V. Carcello,
C. W. Hollingsworth, and S. Mastrolia
(“The Effect of PCAOB Inspections on Big
4 Audit Quality,” working paper) ask
whether the large audit firm inspections by
the PCAOB have resulted in higher quality financial reporting. They compare
abnormal accruals reported by audit clients
before and after a Big Four firm’s initial
inspection by the PCAOB. If the inspections result in improved auditing, they
expect to see less earnings management
after the initial inspection. For comparison purposes, they make the same observations before and after AICPA peer
review inspections made prior to SOX.
SEPTEMBER 2010 / THE CPA JOURNAL

The authors find a significant decrease
in income-increasing abnormal accruals
in the first and second years following the
initial PCAOB inspection. They find no
similar decrease after AICPA peer review
inspections, and conclude that the PCAOB
inspections have a significant positive
effect on audit quality—and thus, financial
reporting—unlike AICPA inspections.

Chambers and Payne
A recent paper by Dennis J. Chambers
and Jeff L. Payne (“Audit Quality and
Accrual Reliability: Evidence from the Preand Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods,” working paper) differs from the other four
papers discussed above by measuring accrual reliability instead of abnormal accruals.
SOX specifically mentions the intent of
Congress to increase the reliability of financial reporting. Therefore, Chambers and
Payne measure the reliability of accruals
before and after SOX, where “reliability” is
defined as the degree to which current accruals are repeated, or persist, in earnings in the
following year. They examine companies
audited by Big Four (or Six) and non-Big
Four firms and develop a measure of audit
firm independence. This measure considers
auditors that derive a significant portion of
their audit revenues from a particular
industry to have reduced levels of independence due to the economic significance of
the clients in that industry. They partition
their sample into clients of audit firms with
relatively more independence and those with
potentially impaired independence.
Chambers and Payne find that the reliability of reported accruals is significantly
higher in the post-SOX period compared
to the pre-SOX years. This finding is true
for companies of all sizes (i.e., both Big
Four [or Six] and smaller firms). They also
find that the companies with the greatest
improvement in accrual reliability postSOX are the clients of smaller audit firms
that had relatively lower levels of independence before SOX. This result implies
that the provisions of SOX intended to
improve audit firm independence are
affecting financial reporting decisions and
potentially narrowing the quality difference
between large and small auditors.

Implications
All five of the studies provide evidence
that the financial reporting environment has

significantly improved since SOX. There is
evidence of less accruals-based earnings management and of greater accrual reliability. The
stated goal of SOX was to improve the
quality of reported financial numbers.
While it is difficult to quantify the improvement, the evidence in these studies is consistent with the idea that SOX significantly
improved the quality of financial reporting.
There are two important caveats, however. First, two of the studies found evidence that companies are, to some
degree, shifting their earnings management
techniques from managing accruals to
real earnings management methods, such
as reducing discretionary spending on
R&D and advertising. Thus, there is evidence that real earnings management actually has increased in the post-SOX period, partially offsetting the reduction in
accruals-based earnings management.
Second, any observed improvement in
financial reporting may not be solely the
result of SOX. During the same period,
public expectations of corporate executives
increased markedly, media attention on
financial reporting was nearly unprecedented, and criminal prosecutions of fraudsters also may have led to better reporting, even in the absence of SOX. Thus,
several factors—including the passage of
SOX—may account for the overall
improvement in reporting quality.
Researchers continue to examine the
direct and indirect costs of SOX, which are
considerable, and have begun to document
the apparent benefit of SOX, namely an
increase of the quality of financial reporting. The research is not yet at the point
where an overall cost/benefit comparison
can be made. Based on the body of
research evidence to date, however, the
quality of financial reporting does appear
to be higher in the post-SOX period. ❑
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